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Appellant, Daniel English, by and through his counsel of 
record, Fred R. Silvester, Esq., Charles P. Sampson, Esq., and 
Claudia P. Berry, Esq., of and for Suitter Axland Armstrong & 
Hanson, and pursuant to Rules 24 and 42 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, hereby submits the following brief in response 
to an Order of the Supreme Court of Utah granting Appellant's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant 
to Title VI of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court which provides 
that the Utah Supreme Court, at its discretion, may review a 
judgment, order or decree of the Court of Appeals upon Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari. 
A Petition for Writ of Certiorari was submitted to this 
Court on July 3, 1989, for the purpose of requesting that the 
Court review the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, issued 
on May 10, 1989, denying the plaintiff's appeal from an entry of 
summary judgment by the District Court and a subsequent order 
of the Utah Court of Appeals, entered on June 2, 1989, denying 
the plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing. This Court entered an 
Order on August 31, 1989, granting the plaintiff's Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented to this Court for review: 
1. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in finding that 
no disputed issues of fact exist regarding the responsibility 
of the decedent, Robert English ("decedent" or "English"), for 
his own death and, therefore, that the defendant, Albert Kienke 
("defendant" or "Kienke"), did not breach his duty as landlord? 
2. Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in holding that 
it need not address the issue of whether an employee-employer 
relationship existed between English and Kienke since the Court 
had already concluded, as a matter of law, that the tenant, Eng-
lish, had been negligent rather than Kienke and, therefore, that 
Kienke had not breached his duty as landlord? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
This Court's interpretation of the following statute, (Ap-
pended to this Brief as Appendix "A"), is pertinent to the deter-
mination of the issues presented for review: 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (1953, as amended). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a wrongful death action brought by Daniel English, 
as Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert English, al-
leging negligence on the part of the defendant for (1) his failure 
as a landlord to make safe or to advise the decedent of the dan-
gerous condition which existed on property owned by the defendant 
at 1031 Windsor Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, and (2) his failure 
as an employer to provide a safe work place and to properly in-
struct his employee, the decedent. On January 4, 1986, while 
the decedent was repairing the front porch of the residence at 
1031 Windsor, the porch roof, approximately 36 inches thick and 
15 feet long, fell on decedent causing severe personal injur-
ies which later resulted in his death. At the time of the acci-
dent, the decedent was employed by the defendant to provide gen-
eral labor on the residence located at 1031 Windsor Street. 
The residence was owned by the defendant. 
Plaintiff's Complaint seeks damages from the defendant under 
two theories of recovery. First, the defendant breached his 
duty as the owner and landlord of the residence at 1031 Windsor 
by failing to use reasonable care to discover the dangerous condi-
tion which existed at the residence and either correct this condi 
tion, or adequately warn the decedent of the dangerous condition 
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and unreasonable risk which existed at the residence- Second, 
the defendant breached his duty as an employer by failing to 
provide a safe place for the decedent to work, by failing to 
adequately supervise the decedent's work on the residence, by 
failing to adequately prepare and design the construction project 
which he initiated on the residence, by failing to properly in-
struct the decedent and by failing to provide workers compensation 
insurance. This second theory of recovery turns on the issue 
of whether the defendant was the decedent's statutory employer 
under the provisions of Utah's Workers' Compensation Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (1953, as amended). If an employee-employer 
relationship existed, then the remaining provisions of Utah's 
Workers' Compensation Act, including section 35-1-57, apply. 
Under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-57, the fact of 
the injury itself constitutes a prima facie case of negligence, 
and the defendant cannot avail himself of the affirmative defenses 
of assumption of risk or contributory negligence. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On September 14, 1987, the Honorable David S. Young of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
entered an Order (Record [hereinafter "R."] pp. 223-24) granting 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Order was supported 
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by the Court's Memorandum Decision dated August 31, 1987 (R. 
pp. 212-15), in which the Court made numerous factual findings 
including the following: 
1. The defendant had no greater responsibility than 
the decedent to perceive and discover the dangerous condition 
and risk created by the porch; 
2. The defendant had "no greater responsibility to 
inform the decedent of the risk than the decedent should have 
perceived on his own;" and 
3. The defendant did not fail in his duty to exercise 
reasonable care to make the conditions safe. 
4. The Court also found that the decedent was an inde-
pendent contractor and not an employee under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
Plaintiff appealed the decision of the District Court 
and on May 10, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its Opinion 
affirming entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 
Plaintiff filed a timely Petition for Rehearing. The Petition 
for Rehearing was denied by the Utah Court of Appeals in an Order 
issued June 2, 1989. 
On July 3, 1989, plaintiff petitioned the Utah Supreme 
Court for a Writ of Certiorari for the purpose of having the 
Court review the decision of the Court of Appeals. This Court 
issued an Order on August 31, 1989, granting the Petition of 
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Certiorari. 
C Statement of Relevant Facts 
The following facts are material to the Court's determina-
tion of this Appeal: 
1. Defendant was in the business of managing, renting, 
collecting rents and maintaining residential properties which 
he owned throughout the Salt Lake City area. (R. p. 269: 
Deposition of Albert Kienke, pp. 4-8.) 
2. Defendant, as part of providing rental units, also 
took responsibility for repair and maintenance, either by person-
ally undertaking the repairs and maintenance or by hiring others 
to do so on his various rental properties. (R. p. 269: Kienke 
Deposition, pp. 6-9, 18-19, 21-23, 26-29, 31-34.) 
3. Defendant has declared that his business is the 
business of being a landlord. (R. p. 182 13.) 
4. One of the residential rental properties owned by 
the defendant was the residence at 1031 Windsor Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. (R. p. 269: Kienke Deposition, pp. 3-4.) 
5. The house needed extensive repairs, including re-
pairs of a hole in the ceiling, holes in the doors, kitchen cab-
inet doors, carpet and repairs to the front porch. (R. p. 153 
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f 2; p. 269: Kienke Deposition, pp. 38-42.) 
6. The posts supporting the lower front porch were 
rotten and one beam supporting the porch ceiling sagged consider-
ably. These conditions existed before the decedent began repair 
work on the porch and the defendant was aware of these conditions 
before the repairs were begun. (R. p. 269: Kienke Deposition, 
pp. 41, 52-54, 68-71.) 
7. In order for the decedent to make repairs to the 
front porch, the defendant provided a power skill saw, shovel, 
a tub in which to mix cement and a roof jack. (R. 269: Kienke 
Deposition, pp. 66-67.) 
8. The decedent was repairing the front porch of the 
defendant's rental unit at 1031 Windsor Street at the time of 
his death on January 4, 1986. (R. p. 269: Kienke Deposition, 
pp. 84-86.) 
9. The decedent was doing repairs under an express 
oral contract of hire which provided that in consideration of 
the decedent's services, the defendant would allow him to live 
in the rental unit rent-free. (R. p. 154, f 6; p. 269: Kienke 
Deposition, pp. 45-48.) 
10. The decedent, Robert English, had no previous con-
struction experience and was not aware of any danger in recon-
structing the porch. (R. p. 269: Kienke Deposition, pp. 92-93.) 
11. At all times relevant herein, the defendant re-
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tained the right to control and did in fact control the work of 
the decedent. (R. p. 269: Kienke Deposition, pp. 48-55, 58-
63, 67-69, 73-76.) 
12. The defendant had been a licensed general con-
tractor in the State of Utah and had several years experience 
in the construction industry. (R. p. 269: Kienke Deposition, 
pp. 12-14.) The defendant also took classes in architecture 
at the University of Utah. (R. p. 269: Kienke Deposition, p. 12.) 
13. The defendant did not obtain a building permit 
for the repair work carried out at 1031 Windsor Street. (R. p. 
269: Kienke Deposition, p. 81.) 
14. The defendant did not have a policy of workers 
compensation insurance. (R. p. 269: Kienke Deposition, p. 84.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial 
court's conclusion that the defendant owed no duty of care to 
his tenant, English, and, therefore, that the defendant did not 
breach any duty to discover and warn or correct the unreasonable 
risk involved in reconstructing the porch on defendant's property. 
The defendant, by virtue of his status as landowner and his 
superior knowledge of construction practices, had a duty to 
apprise the decedent of the dangerous condition and of the gravity 
of the risk and to adequately instruct him so as to eliminate 
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that risk. The breach of such duty is an issue of fact for the 
jury. 
2. The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial 
court's conclusion that English was an independent contractor 
and that the defendant was not his statutory employer. The 
defendant employed the decedent, retained the right of supervision 
and control over the work, and the defendant used the decedent 
in a part or process of the defendant's business as landlord. 
As an employer, under § 35-1-42, the failure to provide worker's 
compensation for English allows the plaintiff under Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-56 (1953, as amended) to pursue this civil action 
and the fact of injury establishes a prima facie case of 
negligence. 
ARGUMENT 
Under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a court, 
when determining whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, 
must construe the facts in favor of the non-moving party. Accord-
ingly, summary judgment should be granted only when it appears 
that there is no reasonable probability that the non-moving party 
can prevail. Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits and admissions submitted in a case show 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Banqerter v. 
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Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983). In ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment, the court may consider only facts which are 
not in dispute. Sorenson v. Beers, 585 P.2d 458 (Utah 1978). 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST 
REGARDING WHETHER THE DEFENDANT, KIENKE, 
BREACHED HIS DUTY AS LANDLORD TO ENGLISH. 
In this case, the Court of Appeals paid lip service 
to appropriate case law, e.g. , Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 
7 06 P. 2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985), which states that summary judgment 
should be granted with great caution where negligence is alleged. 
The Court of Appeals also acknowledged that issues of negligence 
ordinarily present questions of fact which must be resolved by 
the fact finder and that summary judgment is reserved for only 
the most clear-cut negligence cases. Id.: Ingram v. Salt Lake 
City, 733 P.2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987). (R. p. 273.) Nevertheless, 
the Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's Order granting 
summary judgment when obvious issues of material fact existed, 
the resolution of which were required in order to determine whe-
ther the defendant had breached his duty to the decedent as a 
landowner. In its opinion affirming the trial court's decision 
granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that the undisputed material facts demonstrated, 
as a matter of law, that the "decedent created the dangerous 
-10-
condition that caused his own death." (R. p. 274-75.) Based 
upon this finding, standing alone, both the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals concluded as a matter of law, that plaintiff 
had no claim against the defendant, under either the common law 
or Utah Workers' Compensation Act and by implication, that Kienke 
owed the decedent no duty of care. 
A. The Defendant, Kienke, Owed His Tenant, Robert English, 
a Duty of Care Irrespective of Whether Robert English 
Was Negligent. 
Two recent changes in Utah tort law effect the analysis of 
whether the defendant, Kienke, owed a duty of care to his tenant, 
Robert English. First, most jurisdictions, including Utah, have 
abandoned the traditional common law approach which determined 
a landowner's duty of care in terms of whether the person entering 
the landowner's land was an invitee, licensee or trespasser. 
See Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 754 P.2d 89 (Utah 
App. 1988). Second, the Utah Legislature enacted a comparative 
negligence statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37(2) (1987), thereby 
abandoning the doctrine of contributory negligence. See Donahue 
v. Purfee, 118 U.A.R. 64 (filed September 28, 1989). The enact-
ment of a comparative negligence system, in turn, has led the 
Utah courts to reassess corollary doctrines which act as complete 
bars to recovery on the basis that they are incompatible with a 
comparative negligence scheme. 
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In Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. , 631 P.2d 
865 (Utah 1981), for example, this Court expressly renounced 
the assumption of risk doctrine because of its incompatibility 
with a comparative negligence system. Similarly, this Court has 
interpreted Utah's comparative negligence statute to abolish 
the last clear chance doctrine as a complete bar to recovery. 
Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982). 
Recently, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the Utah 
Legislature, by establishing a comparative negligence scheme, 
"has by necessary implication abolished the open and obvious 
danger rule as an absolute bar to an injured guest's recovery." 
Donahue v. Durfee, 118 U.A.R. 64, 66 (filed, September 28, 1989). 
In Donahue, the plaintiff had filed an action against a landowner, 
among others, for injuries suffered when he came in contact with 
an electrical power line. The defendants contended that "they 
owed no duty to warn Donahue or otherwise protect him from the 
power line as it constituted an open and obvious danger." Id. 
at 65. The Utah Court of Appeals rejected this argument and 
stated: 
We hold that even assuming the power line 
was an open and obvious danger, Donahue is 
nonetheless entitled to have the finder of 
fact compare his negligence, if any, in en-
countering the power line with any negligence 
attributable to the defendants in creating 




A major criticism of the open and obvious danger rule, 
according to the Utah Court of Appeals, is the fact that the 
guest's knowledge of an obvious danger should bear only on the 
reasonableness of the guest's subsequent conduct. What the guest 
knew or should have known should not*affect the landowner's duty 
of care. Id, , citing Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 
671 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Idaho App. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 
107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 1208 (Idaho 1984); Parker v. Highland 
Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Texas 1978), As noted in Keller, 
the open and obvious danger rule does not distinguish between 
facts relevant to the landowner's duty of care to guests and 
facts which establish a defense to liability, Keller v. Holiday 
Inns, Inc., 671 P.2d at 1117. 
Following the line of reasoning set forth in Donahue, 
plaintiff in the case now before this Court contends that Kienke 
did, in fact, owe a duty of care to his tenant, Robert English, 
irrespective of whether Robert English was or was not negligent. 
Accordingly, even if English were negligent, as both the trial 
court and Court of Appeals held, that negligence cannot act as 
a complete bar to recovery under Utah's comparative negligence 
scheme. Because Kienke owed a duty of care to Robert English, 
a finder of fact must determine whether Kienke breached his duty 
of care toward the decedent by comparing Kienke's conduct in 
allowing the potentially deadly condition of the front porch to 
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exist with the reasonableness of English's conduct, under all 
the circumstances, in attempting to repair the front porch. 
B. Kienke, As Property Owner, Breached his Duty to English by 
Failing to Repair an Unreasonably Dangerous Condition or by 
Failing to Adeguatelv Warn English of the Condition and Risk 
Involved, 
In Stephenson v. Warner, 581 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah 1978), 
the Utah Supreme Court enunciated a landlord's duty of care toward 
his tenants: 
It is not to be doubted that a landlord is 
bound by the usual standard of exercising 
ordinary prudence and care to see that pre-
mises he leases are reasonably safe and suit-
able for intended uses, nor that under ap-
propriate circumstances he may be held liable 
for injuries caused by any defects or danger-
ous conditions which he created, or of which 
he was aware, and which he should reasonably 
foresee would expose others to an unreasonable 
risk of harm. 
Whether a defendant has breached the requisite standard of care 
is generally a question for the fact finder. Id. at 727. 
Similarly, the Restatement (Seconds of Torts, § 343 
states as follows i-*-
A possessor of land is subject to liability 
for physical harm caused to his invitees by 
a condition on the land if, but only if, he 
1
 Section 343 is cited as the appropriate standard in 
Wheeler v. Jones, 19 Utah 2d 392, 431 P.2d 985 (1967); Rogalski 
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 282 P.2d 304 (1955); 
Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 31, 232 P.2d 210 (1951); 
Wagoner v. Waterslide Inc., 744 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1987). 
-14-
^a^ knows or by the exercise of 
reasonable care would discover the 
condition, and should realize it 
involves an unreasonable risk of 
harm to such, invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will 
not discover or realize the danger, 
or will fail to protect themselves 
against it, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable 
care to protect them against the 
danger. 
T|,ie court- of Appeals apparently based its decision— 
at least in part—upon the M.I<_ • ,-;ced^ :v • • * 1s-
on work. Plaintiff never disputed that the decedent did the 
"hands- .cimately collapsed, Never-
theless, neither the cases cited by th^ Court 01 Appea.. .:•, . see, 
for example, Stephenson v. Warner, 581 v.;..i V—, 568 (Utah 1978)), 
nor the Restatement (Second) of Tortc , ~ ** .sports 
the conclusion that because the decederj, : •> i the- nands-on work 
'ii i he poi Ji ' he dpfpnddiit was absolved ui any •"•. *-. --o English. 
This Is not a situation where a ten,. », : *• :-t 
to the landlord, takes it upon himself to make repairs and dies 
in the process. Rather, hi^nke w.is actively involved in the 
repairs. The record below was replete with facts supporting 
the Inference that the defendant, as - trained contractor/land-
owner who retained the right to :•.-.• ... . • i<j MI f^ ac1 control 
the work of his tenant, breached his duty to exercise reasonable 
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care toward the decedent in all circumstances. 
Whether the defendant breached his duty to the decedent 
depends upon the resolution of three disputed issues of material 
fact: 
1. Whether the condition of the front porch presented 
an unreasonable risk of harm to the decedent; 
2 • Whether the defendant knew or should have known 
of the dangerous condition of the front porch and realized that 
English would not appreciate the risk; and 
3. Whether the defendant corrected the condition or 
properly advised the decedent of the dangerous condition and 
the magnitude of the risk. 
"Whether an unreasonable risk of harm existed is a 
determination of fact to be made by the jury." Wagoner v. Water-
slide Inc., 744 P.2d 1012, 1013 (Utah App. 1987). Similarly, 
whether the defendant knew or should have known of the dangerous 
condition of the porch both before and during reconstruction, 
and whether the defendant corrected the danger or adequately 
warned the decedent of the risk are also disputed factual issues 
that should be determined by the fact finder. 
This Court, in Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 
31, 232 P.2d 210, 212 (1951), analyzing similar factual issues 
under the standard of care set forth in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 343, found that these issues must be determined by 
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the jury. In Erickson, the plaintiff sued Walgreen Drug Company 
and others for . - -.• •'• •"• idn on a wet terrazzo 
floor in the entrance way of the drugstore. At issue was whet he " 
Mho clofiendcints "knew or should have known -:•: the propensities 
of the floor to become slippery when w^ >t - • •?• - ier.t in 
failing to warn customers using the entrance way -i the hazard 
i nvol oed HI tn obviate the slippery condition by covering the 
floor with mats or by the use of other mea.;.-. ' Id* . ' * 
The Court stated that, 
From all of the evidence, we think a jury 
could reasonably conclude that the appellant 
knew or should have known of the propensities 
of its terrazzo entrance way to become slip-
pery when wet and should have realized that 
because of these propensities, it created 
an unreasonable risk to business visitors 
who would not discover the slippery condition 
and realize the risk involved therein• 
Id. at i v:. 
hi this case, the facts construed in the 1 i ght most 
favora ble f \ 1 he plaintiff show that the defendant, Kienke, had 
previously been licensed in the State of. Utah as a general con-
tractor and that he had extensive experience in the construction 
industry ( - Lenke Deposition, pc. 1?-;**. En con-
trast, the deceden. .icw n^ Drier constr^.i •._ A^er >o - ;id 
had never done structural repair on an existing dwelling—facts 
of which the defendai was wo I 1 aware, me defendant's 
statements in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
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pp. 153-159) which assumed that English was as subjectively aware 
of an open and obvious danger as the defendant are unwarranted 
and clearly the opposite could be inferred. A factual issue 
exists as to whether the defendant had superior training and 
knowledge in construction that would enable him to recognize 
the unreasonable risk of harm created by the dilapidated condition 
of the porch or by English's methods of reconstructing or, through 
the exercise of diligence, that would lead him to discover the 
dangerous state of disrepair of the porch which was not recognized 
by English. In either situation, the defendant will be held 
liable under the standard enunciated in the Restatement. Comment 
c to § 342 states that: 
The possessor's duty also arises it he has 
had peculiar experience which enables him to 
realize the risk involved in a condition 
which he should recognize as unlikely to be 
appreciated by his licensee as an ordinary 
man or where he knows that his licensee's 
experience and intelligence is likely to 
prevent him from appreciating the risk which 
is appreciable by a man of ordinary experience 
and j udgment.2 
Section 343A(1) provides that: 
A possessor of land is not liable to his 
invitees for physical harm caused to them 
by any activity or condition of the land 
whose danger is known or obvious to them, 
unless the possessor should anticipate the 
2 Although § 342 relates to the duty owed by a property 
owner to a licensee, rather than to a business invitee, that sec-
tion expresses a duty that is equally applicable to both types 
of visitors. 
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harm despite such knowledge or obviousness. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Because of the defendant's superior knowledge and be-
cause of th^ .a:* ;• - r".. , • the defen-
dant hac .: * • English oo give adequate warning :^ the exist-
ion . ' ^ YV*aJcf* t hat condition safe. 
If the risk associated with English's rerunstruci I -"-it of 1 lie pnrrdi 
created an unreasonable risk of harm and if that risk was obvious 
+•0 the del^ndnnt i>>rLiij?u i . in o(instruction experience, the 
defendant bad a duty to provide detailed instructions and warnings 
regard eg che methods English should use in reconstructing the 
porch. This duty arose at Mi*-1 Lime wh<-Mi ho observed the recon-
struction of the porch and the methods being used to support 
the pot'Ai II, Imwpvpr, the dangerous condition of the porch 
was due tn unseen, internal structural defic.v,, i-^ -. S:ojlish 
had no way of knowing such conditions existed or how to find 
such conditions because ol Ii LS lack; of. experience in the con-
struction trade. Defendant/ on the other hand, as property owner, 
had .1 dul ', IM discover such latent defects and warn English of 
those defects. In addition, defendan -u:--ior 
training in the construction trade, knew or should have discovered 
that the hidden structural deficiencies in the dilapidated porch 
created an unreasonable risk of harm to English. > - -. ise, 
defendant's duty is firmly established - ^ a- - n.s preach of 
that duty is an issue o; * :. * j . >-c trier of 
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fact. Because under Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party, the 
plaintiff is entitled to the inference that English did not appre-
ciate the risk. 
Because of the numerous factual issues that exist re-
garding whether Kienke breached his duty as landowner, this Court 
should remand this case to the trial court on the basis that 
genuine issues of material fact exist which must be submitted 
to the trier of fact for resolution. 
II. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
IT NEED NOT DECIDE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE 
DEFENDANT WAS THE STATUTORY EMPLOYER OF ENG-
LISH SINCE THE COURT HAD ALREADY CONCLUDED 
THAT ENGLISH'S OWN NEGLIGENCE CAUSED HIS 
DEATH. 
The Court of Appeals failed to address the propriety 
of the District Court's ruling that English was an independent 
contractor and that Kienke was not liable as an employer under 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. (R. p. 269: Kienke 
Deposition, p. 81.) According to the Court of Appeals, since it 
was conclusive as a matter of law that the decedent, rather than 
Kienke, was the negligent party, the court did not need to reach 
the issue of statutory employment. (R. p. 275.) However, "it 
is possible for an individual to be an 'independent contractor' 
in a common law sense, and yet be a 'statutory employer' for 
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workmen's compensci . s. . . . j.-'-^ - construction 
Co. v. Frisby, S"8 i- . ~ : ' «'.-••". -a** ; See also, Bennett 
v. Industrial „ .^n^, > : - t: -it ^  '986). addition, 
the court's conclusion that Englj. • .* : - ';y 
made within the context of a landlord-tenant relationship. Even 
as sunt my arguendo r" • •• \e did not breach the duty of care 
he owed a, landlord and that English was negligent- —. . 
Mu» DisLrjLuu Court and the Court of Appeals held--it does no: 
follow that the court is thereby rel ieved oi • .-.c -,,-n • - h ty 
of determining whether an employer-employee relationship existed 
b e t, w e e n K I e r i k t;• i P ') H n" ] ] is 1" i 
For one, the duty uweci by j landlord lo a Lilian t i a 
not the same as the duty owed by an employer to its employee. 
The employer owes rujndelegab le ..iul.it-1.-; ti furnish i; 1 ) a reasonably 
safe place to work, (2) reasonably safe materials and equipment 
with which I1) work, and reasonably safe methods by which to 
work. Wallace v. Kentucky Fried Chicken of Lawton, Okia. .": ^  
P.2d 504 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974). More importantly, however, the 
issue of whe ther ai I employee-employer relationship exists is 
separate and distinct from the issue of whether and under what 
circumstances a landlord may be held liable for injuries sustained 
by a tenant. 
- 2 l l -
A. The Defendant, Albert Kienke, was the Statutory Employer of 
Robert English, 
Utah's Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann,, § 35-
1-42 (1953, as amended) defines "employer" and "statutory employ-
er" for the purpose of determining those situations where the duty 
to provide workers' compensation to an employee under the Act 
exists. Section 35-1-42 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
The following shall constitute employers 
subject to the provisions of this title: 
(2) Every person, firm and private cor-
poration, including every public utility, 
having in service one or more workmen or 
operatives regularly employed in the same 
business, or in or about the same establish-
ment, under any contract of hire, express 
or implied, oral or written . • . 
Where any employer procures any work 
to be done wholly or in part for him by a 
contractor over whose work he retains super-
vision or control, and such work is a part 
or process in the trade or business of the 
employer, such contractor, and all persons 
employed by him, and all subcontractors under 
him, and all persons employed by any such 
subcontractors shall be deemed, within the 
meaning of this section, employees of such 
original employer. 
The statute thus imposes liability for workers' com-
pensation on any employer who directly hires someone to work in 
his business, A person who hires a contractor to perform work 
for him may also qualify as a statutory employer by: 
1. Employing the contractor; 
2, Retaining the right of supervision or control 
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c * \ • ; a n d 
3* Using m e contractor in a pa rt or prui.eb " ' -
trade or business of the employer. 
. 1 ri onJei: \A I detenu :i ne whe ther the decedent was an em-
ployee of Kienkef the trial court should have applied the criteria 
set forth i i: i Berinet t * „ Industrial Commission, 726 P. 2d 427 (Utah 
1986) The court in Bennett stated tha t: 
[T]he remedial purpose of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act supports the conclusion that 
§ 35-1-42(2) should be construed in favor of 
protecting the employee* . , The Arizona 
Supreme Court, in construing an almost identi-
cal statutory provision, has stated that it 
'is a legislatively created scheme by which 
conceded nonemployees are deliberately brought 
within the coverage of the [Workmens' Com-
pensation] Act.' . . . Wisconsin has also 
recognized the broad scope of its similar 
statute: 
The entire statutory scheme indi-
cates a desire on the part of the 
legislature to extend the protection 
of these laws to those who might 
not be deemed employees under the 
legal concepts governing the li-
ability of a master for the tortious 
acts of his servant. 
iQ *:. 432-JJ (citations omitted). 
The Bennett court was expJ I c i t as to what constitutes 
supervision or control: 
The requirement in § 35-1-42(2,) that the 
general contractor, as a 'statutory employer,' 
retain 'supervision or control' over the 
work of the subcontractor . . . cannot, by 
definition, be equated with the common law 
standard for determining whether a person 
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is an employee or an independent contractor, 
. , the statutory requirement that the 
general contractor have 'supervision or 
control' over the work of the subcontractor 
cannot mean that the subcontractor must also 
qualify as an employee of the general 
contractor. That would be at least highly 
improbable and perhaps impossible by 
definition. Rather, the term 'supervision 
or control' requires only that the general 
contractor retain ultimate control over the 
project. 
Id, at 431-32 (citations omitted). 
In order for the lower court to find after construing 
the facts in the plaintiff's favor that the relationship between 
the defendant and the decedent, Robert English, was not that of 
statutory employer-employee, the court had to determine three 
issues based on undisputed facts: 
1, That a contract of employment did not exist; 
2, That the defendant retained no right of super-
vision or control over the work of Robert English; and 
3, That Robert English's work on the residence at 
1031 Windsor was not a part or process in the trade or business 
of the defendant. 
It is undisputed that the defendant directly hired 
the decedent, Robert English, to perform remodeling and repair 
work on the defendant's property at 1031 Windsor Street under 
an express oral contract of employment. None of the testimony 
in this case and none of the statements of disputed or undisputed 
facts contained in defendant's memoranda filed in this case have 
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ever dispute* I that a < :ontrac t: of employment existed between Albert 
Kienke and Robert English. I t i s a lso undisputed that the de-
fendant :i s i n the trade or business of being a landlord and that; 
1 .> • repai r a i id remode] i rig c ' 1 : r e n ta ] i :i; i i :i t::s i i:. d 11.1 r I in p r o c e s s 
in the trade or business or ne.nq a landlord. 
Since a contract ui employment existed between the 
defendant ar»'" \he decedent and since tl :ie decedei 1 t a a : ..-• 
in work whici: instituted a part of the defendant's trade )r 
bus i ne s s, court couia 
have ruled that Kienke was not English's statutory employer would 
have been through a finding that Kienke did not retain the right 
to exercise control • ::»i: . * . , . , . ~> 'emode 
and reconstruction activities. 
jtal:i ^s w e ^ Q settled that an employer need 
only retain the right to control the work of another in order to 
be declared the statutory employer of that other individual. The 
s t a 1111 o i: y e in p ] o y e i: i i e e d i 1 o I: a c t: u a 1 ] y e x e r c I s e t h a t :: o n t r o 1. 
See Adamson v. Okland Construction Company, 2 9 Utah 2d _"86, )z 
P.2d 805 (1973); Lee v. Chevron Oil Company, 565 P V ; ' 
(Utah 1y7 7 ) ; Kinne v. Industrial Commission. ; 
1980); Pinter Construction Company v. Frisby, -~5 . , 2d 305 (Utah 
1984); Hinds v. Herm Hughes k Sons, IJHJ » ' / r.zu 561 (Utah 
1978) In Hinds v. Herm Hughes, for example, an employee of a 
subcontractor (Mark Hayes' Masonry) brought an action against 
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Herm Hughes, the contractor which had contracted with the plain-
tiff's employer for the latter to construct masonry walls on a 
construction project. At issue was whether Herm Hughes was the 
statutory employer of the plaintiff. The court found that a 
conflict existed in the evidence as to the role played by the 
construction foreman of Herm Hughes and whether that foreman 
had the right to control the work done by the plaintiff. The 
court stated that since the plaintiff's right to recover depended 
upon his showing that Herm Hughes did not have any right to con-
trol the work of the subcontractor's employees, it would be neces-
sary to have a trial of the issue of facts because of the conflict 
in the evidence on a material issue of fact. The decision makes 
clear that it is the right to control which is critical to a 
determination of status as statutory employer and that whether 
such control exists is a factual issue for which summary judgment 
may not be proper. 
Kienke, in this case, did exercise control. He not 
only retained the right to supervise and control the work of 
English, but he actually told English what to do, where to do 
it and, as admitted by the defendant, in defendant's Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. p. 155 15 9, 13), 
he retained the right to approve each project and to control 
the purse strings over the project. The defendant provided actual 
approval of work to be done on the project and furnished tools 
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to carry out the project. (n - " l ' II 14 h S1) KiM.ki 
Deposition, ^S-b ne iefendant also gave Englisn instructions 
regard. • , • —- : run roof should be braced— 
a clear indication 01 conn^-. • ;ver the methods used (R. p. 87), 
In addition, Kienke agreed that because of the rotting condition 
o 1" i he poich, Llie decedent w<mlij havo I D cebu i M ltnj pnrch tiH 
he gave directions for bracing the ceiling, (R. p 2b9: Kienke 
Deposition, pp, 7 3-74.) 
The undisputed facts in tl i i s case establ I sh tha t Rober t 
English was an employee and that -J> defendant was his statutory 
employer for pi :i rposes of Uta- *• - •* : Compensation Ac t. This 
Court, therefore, pursuant the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-42 and in accordance with the guidelines set forth in 
Bennett, should hold tl la t a i i employer-employee relati oi ishi p exi si: 
ed between Kienke and English for purpose of Utah's Workers' 
C omp e n s a t i o n Ac t:. 
B. Because Kienke Was English's Employer For Purposes of Utah's 
Worker's Compensation Act, All Remaining Provisions Of That 
Act Are Applicable To This Action. 
If the defendant in this action is deemed to be a stat-
utory employer under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. S >r 
42, then Kienke wou • ; .:ave beei I requ ired to secure w- :.?• 
pensation insurance for English, in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. it i s i ind I sputed that, the defendant did not 
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secure such workers' compensation insurance. (R. p. 269: Kienke 
Deposition, p. 84.) As a result, Kienke is subject to the pen-
alties set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-57, which permits an 
employee to bring a civil action against an employer and pro-
vides that "[pjroof of the injury shall constitute prima facie 
evidence of negligence on the part of the employer and the burden 
shall be upon the employer to show freedom from negligence result-
ing in such injury." This statutory scheme allows the fact of 
the injury or death and any other facts showing unreasonable 
action on the part of the employer to be submitted to a jury 
and places the burden on the employer to counter the facts showing 
negligence. Moreover, "the defendant shall not avail himself 
of any of the following defenses: . . . the defense of assumption 
of risk, or the defense of contributory negligence." Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-57. However, neither the District Court nor the 
Court of Appeals addressed this issue. 
The policy created by the Court of Appeals' failure 
to address the statutory employer issue raised by the plaintiff 
on appeal will only encourage landlords to hire unskilled main-
tenance and remodeling people, and assign them projects with-
out adequate training, tools or supervision. When an injury or 
death occurs, the employer will then be absolved of any responsi-
bility under the Workers' Compensation Act or common law, since 
the landlord will be able to claim that the dangerous condition 
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was • : :reated b \ the worker arid, therefore, that the worker' s own 
negligence, as a matter of law, bars recover, ^o perni- .a • 
judgment on this basis would reinstitute : he arcane notion :.•;: 
contributory neyli'jHm <> whirh ui < -, rejected • •*• ; - • . - 3 c-l i ction 
over a decade ago. See, Dixon v. Stewart, 658 r-2.: *QQ 
(Utah 1982). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant, as a landowner and as an individual with 
superior knowledge,- had the duty 4 exercise reasonable care 
toward the decedent Ui nibpyrl llm [)on.ii mi h 1 -i rental property 
and adequately warn the decedent regarding the nature and extent 
of the 1: I sk I nvolved in reconstructing the porch, Whether these 
duties were property discharged is a question of fact for the 
trier of fact in this case and should H- I have been disposed of 
o n 5 iiiniTi a 1: y j 11 d gin e n 1: 11 1 a d d i t i o: f a c t: s :> f t h I s c a s e 
conclusively show that the defendant was the statutory employer 
of the decedent and not an independent contractor. The Court 
of Appeals' decision uphold.! ng the tria ] court s order rjrantinq 
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summary judgment in favor of the defendant should be reversed 
and the case should be remanded for trial. 
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LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
Section 35-1-42 
35-1-42. Employers enumerated and defined—Regularly employed—In-
dependent contractors.—The following shall constitute employers subject 
to the provisions of this t i t le: 
(1) The state, and each county, city, town and school district therein. 
(2) uvcry person, firm and private corporation, including every pub-
lic utility, having in service one or more workmen or operatives regularly 
employed in the same business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except 
agricultural laborers and domestic servants; provided, that employers 
of agricultural laborers and domestic servants, shall have the right to come 
under the terms uf chis title by complying with the provisions tnereof and 
the rules and regulations of the commission. 
The term "regularly" as herein used shall include all employments in 
the usual course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of the em-
ployer, whether continuous throughout the year or for only a portion of 
the year. 
TThere any employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part 
for hi-m by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or con-
trol, and such work is a part or process m the trade or business of the 
employer, such contractor, and all persons employed by him, and all 
subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any such subcon-
tractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning of this section, employees 
of such original employer. Any person, firm or corporation engaged m 
the performance of work as an independent contractor shall be deemed 
an employer within the meaning of this section. The term "independent 
contractor,*' as herein used, is defined to be any person, association or 
corporation engaged in the performance of any work for another, who, 
while so engaged, is independent of the employer m all that pertains to 
the execution of the work, is not subject to the rule or control of the em-
ployer, is engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece of 
work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in 
accordance with the employer's design. 
APPENDIX "A* 
